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‘Die Formulierung einer Frage ist ihre Lösung’  
– Karl Marx, 19191 
 
Political upheavals continue to disrupt not only established institutions and organisations, 
but raise a fundamental challenge to political scientists’ capacities to understand and 
explain political change. Recent changes in British politics, including the organisational 
make-up and ideological direction of political parties, outcomes of recent general 
elections, and the referendum to leave the European Union, for example, indicate that 
questions about how we conceive of political change matters. These questions may revolve 
around the process of change (revolutionary, evolutionary, punctuated equilibrium, etc.) 
and the causes of change (critical junctures, anomalies, exogenous shocks, material 
interests, windows of opportunity, the role of power, etc.), within and across institutional 
boundaries. 
 
The continuing growth of interpretive approaches to political science (what Gofas and Hay 
(2010) term the ‘ideational turn’) gives us an opportunity to further understand change 
from different theoretical perspectives. Interpretive approaches call on social scientists to 
take actors’ ideas and beliefs seriously as part of explanatory political analysis (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2016). These approaches shift focus directly to actors’ interpretations, attitudes, 
beliefs and everyday behaviours. With respect to political change, this implies a focus on 
how actors make sense of their place in situations, institutions or broader constellations 
of ideational frameworks and how those beliefs not only shape action but can and do 
change behaviour (within, as part of, or beyond institutions). Though there exist many 
varieties of interpretive analysis, a key reference point in UK political science and beyond 
is the theoretically-informed empirical research undertaken by Mark Bevir and R.A.W. 
Rhodes (2003, 2006, 2010, 2016). Since the publication of their seminal study, 
Interpreting British Governance (2003), their approach has made an important and 
distinctive contribution to debates about not only British governance but also, and more 
widely, to debates about how we approach and study political phenomena (e.g. Finlayson 
et. al., 2004; Glynos and Howarth, 2008; Marsh and Hall, 2016). 
 
Bevir and Rhodes have consistently engaged with debates on interpretive theory and how 
it can be taken forward. In doing so, their approach has developed over time (e.g. Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2008a, 2008b, 2012). The continuing relevance of their approach can be seen 
                                                     
1 Author’s translation: ‘The formulation of a question is its solution’ (Marx, 1919 [1844], p.9). 
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in the wide range of settings it has been applied, including: community leadership 
(Sullivan, 2007); crisis management (Wilkinson, 2011); bureaucratic elites (Gains, 2009); 
and parliamentary practices (Author, forthcoming). However, and despite the growing 
importance of their work (as seen with the growth of edited collections on their approach: 
Bevir and Rhodes, 2016; Turnbull, 2016), we still understand little about how the 
interpretive approach can help to explain change. This may be an odd statement given that 
Bevir and Rhodes have long focused on how traditions have clashed in order to explain 
conflict and modification of political practices over time. Moreover, they have identified a 
concept – ‘dilemmas’ – as a way to explain those shifting practices. In short, they argue 
that political actors amend their beliefs, and therefore their actions, practices and wider 
webs of belief, in response to problems or questions that actors face. However, detailed 
theoretical explication or its empirical application has been neglected. And with it, a 
chance is missed to use the concept of ‘dilemmas’ as analytical hook to develop a deeper 
and more substantial understanding around political change within and beyond 
institutions, organisations, and practices. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes’ limited application of dilemmas has a number of repercussions. First, 
it limits the dynamism of their approach (Hay, 2011: p.178; Wagenaar, 2011: p.4). Without 
a detailed explication of dilemmas, the heart of interpretive political science is removed in 
the sense that there is no clash or contest of ideas. This is important because, if we define 
politics as the process of contestation between different world views, then Bevir and 
Rhodes unintentionally elide a fundamental element of politics (Finlayson, 2007: pp.549-
52). Second, without an adequate explanation of why things change or why things stay the 
same, the explanatory value of other concepts has been questioned, including that of 
tradition (Hay in Finlayson et. al., 2004: pp.144-7; Glynos and Howarth, 2008) and 
narratives (Finlayson et. al., 2004: pp.152-3). This therefore raises a challenge over the 
explanatory value of Bevir and Rhodes’ conceptual framework. Third, and relatedly, there 
is a wider debate about the explanatory power of interpretive approaches. This has been 
subject to considerable discussion (e.g. see Keith Dowding’s The Philosophy and Methods 
of Political Science, and symposium on this in Political Studies Review (vol.15, issue 2)). 
While Bevir and Rhodes have defended the explanatory power of interpretive approaches 
(e.g. 2006, pp.19-21), questions remain. 
 
Given these issues (discussed at more length in the substantive sections of this article), a 
more developed understanding of how dilemmas shape politics offers an important 
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intervention. It would address all three issues relating to the politics of clashing beliefs, 
the coherence of the conceptual framework, and the explanatory power of the approach. 
That is the purpose of this article, and to do so, I have split my argument into three 
sections. First, I review the application of the concept in Bevir and Rhodes’ work, showing 
that, while dilemmas are mentioned throughout their empirical research, the concept is 
not central to their analysis. This highlights two core weaknesses: ambiguity surrounding 
the process of change (i.e. actions and practices conducive to change) and a lack of 
appreciation for the strategic context in which dilemmas take place (i.e. power relations). 
In the second section, I address those concerns to develop a more robust articulation of 
the concept. In this section, dilemmas are linked to everyday practices and to power 
relations by drawing on the concept of ‘problematisation’. I argue that dilemmas arise out 
of conflicting practices and are framed by a strategic context, both of which mean that 
dilemmas are not open-ended and indeterminate but resolved precisely depending on how 
they arise. The article closes in a third, brief section to show why dilemmas matter in 
understanding political change, and highlights dilemmas as fundamental to carry out 
explanatory research within an interpretive conceptual framework.  
 
The consequences of a detailed articulation of dilemmas are profound for the interpretive 
approach. It not only provokes a debate about how we can understand and explain change 
in Bevir and Rhodes’ work, but enables interpretive scholars to take the approach forward 
by addressing some of the concerns noted above. It allows scholars to take dilemmas as a 
core concept through which to explain political upheavals and how political actors respond 
to those upheavals. In highlighting the importance of dilemmas, it affects other concepts 
in Bevir and Rhodes’ toolkit, too, by adding depth to how we explain the persistence and 
modification of traditions, practices and beliefs. In this way, this article opens new, rich 
opportunities to apply dilemmas and explain change. 
 
 
1. The interpretive approach 
 
The interpretive approach to political science offers a philosophical outlook on the world 
from ontological and epistemological principles; it is not a set of methodological 
techniques. It has been discussed and debated in a number of books and journals 
(including this journal) (e.g. Finlayson et. al., 2004; Glynos and Howarth, 2008; Marsh 
and Hall, 2016). The basic premise of the approach comes from an anti-foundationalist 
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philosophy, which presumes that there is no foundation or essence to social reality (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2010: p.42). In other words, political actors do not have pure, unmediated or 
objective access to the world; instead, they must construct their reality through 
engagement with the world, and their beliefs about it. This basic philosophical approach 
has significant implications for the study of politics: 
 
We can understand and explain practices and actions adequately only by reference to 
the beliefs and desires of the relevant actors. Hence to study political life adequately 
we have to engage in the interpretation of the beliefs and desires of those we study 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: p.18).  
 
This means that we must take seriously individuals’ interpretations of the world – 
including their beliefs, values, interests and passions – in order to explain their behaviour. 
Individuals do not have given interests, as rational choice theorists (for example) assume; 
they are constructed, learned, shared, debated. 
 
A further implication from the above is that individuals are not autonomous from their 
social contexts in order to understand the world around them. Bevir and Rhodes (2010: 
p.74) emphasise the importance of ‘situated agency’:  
 
To accept agency is to imply people have the capacity to adopt beliefs and actions, even 
novel ones, for reasons of their own, and in so doing they can transform the social 
background. So, agency is possible, but it is always situated in a particular context. 
 
By context, the authors use the concept of ‘traditions’. These are made up of a multitude 
of individual beliefs, held by actors, also known as ‘webs of belief’. Other concepts that 
flow from their approach are summarised in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Interpretive approaches – not limited to Bevir and Rhodes – have made significant 
contributions across the human sciences. This has not been without debate, however, 
especially regarding the explanatory power of interpretive scholarship. For some, 
interpretive analysis can only help us to understand political action and practice but not 
explain them (e.g. Hay in Finlayson et. al., 2004). This is, arguably, a misconception 
because the dichotomy between understanding and explanation is a false one. As Bevir 
and Rhodes (2006: p.20) point out: ‘[t]o understand the relevant beliefs is to explain the 
action or practice’. This is because any meaningful explanation of actions or practices must 
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refer to the beliefs and desires that cause them. Causation, here, is taken broadly to mean 
pertinent connections between entities or events. This is not uncontroversial, but flows 
from interpretive philosophical principles that rejects positivist principles of causation as 
law-like generalisations associated with the natural sciences. Instead, causation in 
interpretive analysis depends on conditional connections (i.e. how different beliefs relate 
to one another) and volitional connections (i.e. how different beliefs lead to actions) 
(Bevir, 1999, 2000; Davidson, 1980).2 For Bevir and Rhodes (2016: pp.16-7), the concepts 
of narrative, tradition and dilemma are explanatory concepts in that they demonstrate 
how collections of beliefs relate to one another and lead to certain behaviour. What does 
this mean for explaining political change? For this, our discussion turns to ‘dilemmas’. 
 
1.1. Interpreting the concept of dilemmas 
 
To explain change, Bevir and Rhodes rely on the concept of ‘dilemmas’. It is rooted in 
Mark Bevir’s The Logic of the History of Ideas, in which he argues that (1999: pp.221-2): 
 
People develop, adjust, and transform traditions in response to dilemmas, where 
dilemmas are authoritative understandings that put into question their existing webs 
of belief. Dilemmas prompt changes of belief because they consist of new beliefs and 
any new belief necessarily poses a question of the agent’s webs of belief. 
 
This quote encapsulates the basic way in which a dilemma works, both in Mark Bevir’s 
post-analytic philosophy and empirical work. A dilemma comes about through a tension 
between two or more beliefs but, crucially, it depends on an actor interpreting two (or 
more) beliefs in this way (making it different from the Kuhnian concept of anomalies, for 
example (Bevir, 1999: pp.229-30)). Without interpreting two beliefs as posing questions 
for each other, they may co-exist in contradictory harmony. However, and once an actor 
finds two beliefs in conflict, a ‘dilemma’ arises. In this case, the actor needs to adjudicate 
between those beliefs. They are resolved creatively by actors in different ways. New beliefs 
could: (i) be discarded as unconvincing, (ii) be accommodated within a web of beliefs, or 
(iii) replace an older belief. This could then lead to ripple effects because it could now come 
into conflict with other beliefs within a wider web. This is how – incrementally, slowly and 
painfully – traditions and practices change over time. Alternatively, the introduction of a 
single new belief could have such substantive effects that the coherence of whole traditions 
is ripped apart. Dilemmas are fluid, indeterminate and usually creative responses to 
                                                     
2 There is an important and ongoing debate about this that goes beyond the purview of this article. For example, 
see the symposium on Dowding’s (2016) recent book in Political Studies Review (vol. 15, issue 2). 
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beliefs in conflict. Importantly, there is always agency involved: change happens only after 
actors interpret beliefs, practices or traditions in conflict with one another. This also 
means that dilemmas can come from anywhere: reading a book, personal moral reflection, 
meeting with other people, contrasting experiences of the world, empirical evidence 
and/or statistics, unintended consequences, shock events, a faux pas, natural and/or 
artificial disasters, and many more beside (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: pp.9-11). Ultimately, 
this list is endless because any type of experience and any type of belief can be an 
authoritative question to an established web of beliefs. 
 
1.2. The concept in practice 
 
Examples of dilemmas are not difficult to find. In Bevir’s theoretical work (1999: pp.221-
64), examples are often used in relation to scientific discoveries and how these challenged 
religious beliefs. In their empirical work, Bevir and Rhodes cite numerous political 
examples. In their 2003 book, for instance, the authors discuss how different political 
traditions responded to the ‘dilemma’ of Thatcherism. In particular, they explore how the 
Labour Party accepted the ideas of controlling inflation as a policy goal and accepted the 
existence of an ‘underclass’. In doing so, the Labour Party accommodated new beliefs into 
a socialist tradition that became known as ‘the third way’. Elsewhere, in Governance 
Stories (2006), the authors go into detail about how the National Health Service (NHS) 
has been reformed between 1948 and 2001 as a result of a range of unresolved tensions 
over universalism versus selectivity in providing healthcare, and around different 
interpretations of the concept of autonomy. Meanwhile, in The State as Cultural Practice 
(2010), Bevir and Rhodes explore how the fragmentation of governance reforms of the 
1980s created dilemmas of coordination for ministers and civil servants. And finally, in 
Rhodes’ Everyday Life in British Government (2011: pp.244-79), there is one clear 
diachronic analysis of a dilemma as it unfolds, namely the resignation of Estelle Morris, 
Secretary of State for Education, in 2002 (Rhodes, 2011: pp.244-79). This narrative is one 
in which a dilemma emerges and develops, with competing interpretations to unfolding 
events. It is a good example of how a dilemma unfolds, and about how an initial ‘crisis’ 
about school examination standards turned into one about the politician’s leadership 
qualities. 
 
These examples of how dilemmas have been applied are important and telling about 
change as understood through an interpretive perspective. In particular, what becomes 
7 
clear from these examples is that the concept is applied in such a way as to link one belief 
or set of beliefs to another. The concept thereby provides a pivotal link between two beliefs 
or webs of belief. However, the explanatory account or process of change is left open and 
unexplained. In particular, the question that remains in all examples cited above is an 
explanatory one: why did the above-cited changes occur? With respect to the Labour 
Party, for example, why did it respond to specific beliefs about inflation and social class, 
but not to other aspects of communitarian values? With respect to NHS reforms, why did 
competition and financial prudence come to be seen as the best ways forward for the NHS? 
Only in Rhodes’ narrative account of Estelle Morris do we begin to understand the process 
of an unfolding dilemma – but even here, it is often implied.  
 
In analysing how dilemmas are applied, it suggests that the concept is not actually central 
to analysis; instead, the authors focus on discussing conflicting beliefs and traditions in 
parallel and use dilemmas as a descriptive link. The focus of their analysis is not, therefore, 
on the way that dilemmas are framed or adjudicated, but on summarising the beliefs that 
actors hold at different times. For example, in Interpreting British Governance, the 
authors merely assert that some policies from the New Right were accommodated within 
Labour Party policy, which led to the ‘third way’, without explaining what clash of beliefs 
or practices or traditions led to such changes. Elsewhere, in The State as Cultural Practice 
(2010: 136-55), the authors summarise different narratives of governance as a response to 
dilemmas of policy fragmentation without examining the interaction of different beliefs. 
In sum, when dilemmas are used in Bevir and Rhodes’ empirical work, they are ‘used to 
refer to little more than the simple juxtaposition, combination and recombination of ideas 
and insights’ (Hay, 2011: pp.178-9). This has crucial repercussions because it elides 
something that is normally considered to be an intrinsic part of politics: the contest or 
clash of ideas. Although politics can be defined in multiple ways, conflict is an inherent 
part of politics (Mouffe, 2005; Finlayson, 2007). Battles of ideas are about how society 
should be ordered and what is deemed ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ in the name of a world view 
(or web of beliefs). So, these conflicts are attempts to structure social reality and therefore 
about how social relations, public and private resources, and power should be distributed. 
This conflict is ineradicable, yet it is not central in Bevir and Rhodes’ analyses. In this 
sense, Bevir and Rhodes unintentionally take politics out of interpretive political science. 
This is a topic to which I return in the third section.  
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Because Bevir and Rhodes do not examine how beliefs, practices or traditions interact, 
other scholars have critiqued the explanatory value of interpretive concepts (e.g. Glynos 
and Howarth, 2008; Smith, 2008). Sometimes, this has been done with direct reference 
to explaining change and continuity. For example, Paul Fawcett (2016: pp.41-2, emphasis 
added), in summarising the role of traditions, notes: 
 
[D]ecentered theory can play an important role by highlighting the value of 
interpretation in political analysis, particularly how traditions establish a discursive 
path dependency that helps to shape but not determine policy outcomes. Thus, whilst 
I would argue that we need to acknowledge that traditions can, and do, change, this 
needs to be combined with an understanding of how that change takes place within a 
strategic context that enables and constrains certain types of change over others. 
 
Fawcett makes no mention of the concept of dilemma – even though this is the precisely 
role assigned to that concept in the interpretive armoury. Elsewhere, Jason Glynos and 
David Howarth (2008: p.161) ask: ‘why might some aspects of traditions exert greater 
appeal than others, or why might some aspects resist modification?’. This question was 
posed with reference to a debate over the role of power in the interpretive framework. 
However, and once again, this is where the concept of dilemma should come in. These 
critiques imply that there needs to be greater appreciation of how beliefs and traditions 
change (or persist). We can do so by strengthening the concept of dilemmas through a 
more detailed examination of how the process of change occurs (i.e. how beliefs and 
actions are affected) and the role that power might play in it. Doing so would therefore 
have big implications for the explanatory appeal of interpretive political science, and 
emphasise the connections between different concepts in Bevir and Rhodes’ framework. 
This is the focus of the next section. 
 
 
2. Theorising dilemmas 
 
To overcome the criticisms above, scholars have turned to various other concepts or ideas: 
some have focused directly on the concept of power (Diamond et. al., 2016; Smith, 2008); 
some on rhetoric as a way to explain the contest of ideas (Finlayson, 2007); and others on 
‘extra-discursive’ issues such as governance failures and other ‘institutional pathologies’ 
(Hay, 2011). However, it is not necessary to go beyond Bevir and Rhodes’ approach, but 
rather worth engaging more directly with other theoretical reference points within the 
interpretive tradition (broadly conceived) to strengthen their framework. Specifically, we 
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can bring dilemmas into conversation with a range of other scholars that have taken 
similar ideas, such as ‘problems’ and ‘questions’, as a starting point. There are arguably 
too many to mention, both from across philosophy (Meyer, 1995; Turnbull, 2014; Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994) and empirical social and political sciences (Colebatch et. al. 2010; 
Gusfield, 1981; Hoppe, 2010; Lasswell, 1970). From such a broad range, we can argue – 
loosely – that ‘problems’ offer a framework through which political issues are discussed, 
disseminated and adjudicated. This is therefore fertile ground for further theoretical 
engagement and a setting in which we can place ‘dilemmas’, too. 
 
In particular, I propose to supplement Bevir’s dilemmas with the concept of 
‘problematisation’ as developed by Michel Foucault. Bevir has been influenced in multiple 
ways by Foucault’s work and, though he ultimately came to reject his approach (Bevir, 
2000, 2011), rummaging through Foucault’s ‘toolbox’ of concepts and ideas can still 
provide further insights. Specifically, we can better understand dilemmas by focusing on 
everyday practices and power relations, something to which problematisations are closely 
linked. To make this argument, I summarise the concept of problematisation, and then 
discuss it with reference to dilemmas in two themes: practices and power. 
 
2.1. Problematisations 
 
Problematisations were essential for Foucault. He explains this with reference to his works 
on madness and the prison (Foucault, 1988a: p.257): 
 
The notion common to all the work that I have done since Histoire de la folie [Madness 
and Civilization] is that of problematization, though it must be said that I never 
isolated this notion sufficiently. […] In Histoire de la folie the question was how and 
why, at a given moment, madness was problematized through a certain institutional 
practice and a certain apparatus of knowledge. Similarly, in Surveiller et punir 
[Discipline and Punish], I was trying to analyse the changes in the problematization of 
the relations between crime and punishment through penal practices and penitentiary 
institutions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 
So, what is a problematisation? As Foucault concedes, he did not develop the concept, 
though there are hints in various texts and interviews, which some scholars have since 
attempted to bring together (e.g. Bacchi, 2012; Koopman, 2013). Broadly speaking, 
problematisations are points or moments when ‘regimes of truth’ are put into question; 
when something is introduced ‘into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object 
for thought’ (Foucault, 1988a: p.257). Problematisations are about posing a problem to 
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established practices and beliefs. This can be developed in two ways. First, 
problematisation can be used to describe Foucault’s method and form of critique. In this 
way, a problematisation is used to write ‘histories of the present’. For example, with 
respect to Discipline and Punish (1991 [1977]), Foucault (1988b: p.101) says: ‘[W]hat I 
wanted to write was a history book that would make the present situation comprehensible 
and, possibly, lead to action. […] I wanted to make [the penitentiary situation] intelligible 
and, therefore, criticisable’ (see also, Foucault, 2002a: pp.224-5). Seen in this way, 
problematisations can be linked to normative critique.  
 
However, and in a second sense, problematisations more generally refer to the 
development of questions, or the ‘transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties 
into problems to which […] diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response’ by actors 
(Foucault, 2002c: p.118). For example, in Madness and Civilization (1989 [1967]), 
Foucault traces how medical practitioners put into question their current knowledge of 
‘madness’ and regarded it as insufficient to deal with medical advances, leading doctors 
and scientists to treat it as ‘mental illness’. In this sense, it would be possible to shift the 
boundaries of established truth regimes and, by extension, everyday practices. The aim of 
a problematisation is to show, in the case of not only madness but also sexuality and crime 
and punishment, that these are not fixed essences despite their appearance as ‘altogether 
natural, self-evident, and indispensable’ (Foucault, 2002a: p.225). It is to make visible this 
false self-evidence and to demonstrate the precariousness of these objects as historically 
contingent. This feeds into a wider and well-established theme of Foucault’s work to look 
at how true and false were divided up in any given ‘regime of truth’. Indeed, his history of 
thought is:  
 
the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices, which 
were accepted without question, which were familiar and ‘silent’, out of discussion, 
becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a 
crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions (Foucault, 
2001: p.74). 
 
Seen in this second way, problematisations are not necessarily about critique (though 
often interwoven); it is broadly about how something became a problem and an object of 
thought.  
 
Problematisations offer a clear resonance to the work of Bevir, specifically with the 
concept dilemmas. Both (dilemmas and problematisations) have a similar starting point, 
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in which they question the certainty and stability of a belief, practice or even tradition. It 
is a process in which actors begin to doubt their familiar routines or habits, and they begin 
to identify problems or difficulties of some kind with their established beliefs or world 
views. However, while Bevir and Rhodes keep their definition of dilemmas fairly loose, the 
concept of problematisation has been more clearly developed in tandem with everyday 
practices and linked to power relations. These are explored in the next two sections. 
 
2.2. Practices 
 
Methodologically, Foucault focused on ‘practical texts’ to demonstrate change. With 
regard to his work on prisons, Foucault (2002a: p.225 (emphasis original)) notes that: 
 
[T]he target of analysis wasn’t “institutions”, “theories”, or “ideology” but practices – 
with the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment; 
the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, 
prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances – whatever role these 
elements may actually play – but, up to a point, possess their own specific regularities, 
logic, strategy, self-evidence, and “reason”. It is a question of analysing a “regime of 
practices” – practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is 
done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet 
and interconnect. 
 
This quote crystallises the methodological and analytical focus of Foucault’s work. It also 
gives us greater insight into problematisations in that they emerge and play out through 
practices. In posing questions and problems, by facing obstacles and dilemmas, ‘regimes 
of practices’ change: 
 
If prisons and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it won’t be because a plan of 
reform has found its way into the heads of the social workers; it will be when those who 
have a stake in that reality, all those people, have come into collision with each other 
and with themselves, run into dead ends, problems, and impossibilities, been through 
conflicts and confrontations – when critique has been played out in the real, not when 
reformers have realized their ideas (Foucault, 2002a: p. 236 (emphasis added)). 
 
The crucial point for our purposes is that Foucault centralises the importance of everyday 
life (‘those who have a stake in that reality’) with practices and dilemmas. Social order is 
sustained through these practices to form a ‘regime of truth’. It sustains particular views 
of social spaces and relationships between people, explaining how society should be 
ordered by naturalising what are ultimately arbitrary relationships, processes and 
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practices. A problematisation destabilises that social order, questioning sedimented social 
practices and making explicit the contingent, provisional nature of everyday life.  
 
Foucault’s insights here are important, and suggest that the concept of dilemma must be 
closely linked to practices. In fact, his insights suggest that everyday practices should be 
at the heart of interpretive social inquiry. Bevir and Rhodes (2010: p.75) define practices 
as ‘a set of actions, often a set of actions that exhibit a pattern, perhaps even a pattern that 
remains relatively stable across time’. While their definition has come under some critique 
(e.g. Wagenaar, 2012), it is sufficient to note here (for the purposes of this article) that, in 
accepting the importance of practices for social inquiry to resolve dilemmas, we must 
focus on those everyday practices in order to better understand the process of where and 
how dilemmas emerge, how they develop and how they play out. If we return to Bevir and 
Rhodes’ dilemmas raised earlier, it suggests we need to look precisely at the ‘practical 
texts’ of Labour Party procedures, conventions and practices, or NHS and healthcare 
documents, to understand how beliefs and values changed. Dilemmas are not simply 
about juxtaposing collections of beliefs and assuming that beliefs change. Rather, an 
analysis that takes dilemmas as a focal point must explore how beliefs and traditions 
interact, play out and unfold through actions and practices. We do not necessarily need to 
go as far as Foucault by saying that practices ‘possess their own specific regularities’ 
(implying a loss of agency), but we must focus attention on everyday practices and, most 
importantly, the clash or contest of ideas, beliefs, traditions and narratives that those 
practices represent. This allows us to make connections between different webs of belief 
and helps us to explain how they change, which remains underexplored in Bevir and 
Rhodes’ work. This requires an understanding of the mediating forces of these contests. 
For Foucault, this is where power is important. 
 
2.3. Power 
 
Dilemmas and problematisations ask particular questions about established boundaries 
of thought and practice. This in itself suggests that how a problem is raised, or in what way 
a question is asked, develops the very conditions within which possible responses can be 
given. As such, the formation of a dilemma limits what is perceived to be an acceptable, 
legitimate or even imaginable question to ask in any given context or ideational tradition. 
This is foundational to understanding the development of problematisations. It raises an 
immediate question about what forces mediate this contest or clash of ideas and suggests 
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a focus on power. This is something that Bevir and Rhodes acknowledge (2010: p.76) by 
explaining that power refers to the impact of traditions on individuals’ beliefs and actions, 
and the restrictive consequences of the actions of others. This is, however, the extent of 
their discussion and, so, rather thin. It does not reveal anything about the processes 
involved for any of Bevir and Rhodes’ analytical concepts, and least of all, dilemmas. Here, 
we can turn to the relationship between problematisations and power as drawn out in 
Foucault’s work to supplement our understanding of how dilemmas unfold. 
 
Foucault (1979: pp.92-3) argues that power is multidirectional and relational: 
 
[P]ower must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, 
transforms, strengths, or reverses them […]. Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. 
 
As such, power is ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society’ (p.93). These strategic situations are played out by individuals: 
 
[I]f we speak of the power of laws, institutions, and ideologies, if we speak of structures 
or mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise 
power over others. The term “power” designates relationships between “partners” 
(Foucault, 2002b: p.337). 
 
So, when we talk of power, we talk of power relations. In defining power in this way, it 
suggests a focus on the operation and functioning of power (asking ‘how does power 
operate?’) rather than regarding power as a ‘thing’ or ‘object’, something that Foucault 
rejected. This also suggests a focus on the day-to-day operation or materiality of power. In 
other words, power relations and everyday practices are interwoven.  
 
Power relations are played out through practices: 
 
[Power] is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes 
easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probably or less; in the 
extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one 
or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of 
actions upon other actions (Foucault, 2002b, p.341).  
 
Practices and power are therefore inextricably linked. Power operates throughout society, 
and individuals are intentional and calculated about this; i.e., ‘there is no power that is 
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exercised without a series of aims and objectives’ (Foucault, 1979: p.95). However, this is 
also localised within specific power relations, which means that there is no comprehensive 
strategy or plan for the rationality of power across society. As Foucault put it more 
prosaically: ‘People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; 
but what they don’t know is what “what they do” does’ (quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1983: p.187). It suggests that the operation of power can be analysed by focusing on 
practices. This insight is hugely important because it suggests that power is a force that 
mediates a rupture of contesting beliefs, practices and traditions, and makes it a crucial 
element in explaining how dilemmas unfold. Power sharpens, blurs, strengthens, 
weakens, links or dissociates ideas and arguments together. As a result of power relations, 
some ideas and practices are prioritised, while others are marginalised or beyond political 
imagination. In this way, we can explain why some ‘traditions’ and ‘webs of belief’ – as 
Glynos and Howarth (2008) ask – exert persuasive appeal and resist modification. It is 
through a greater articulation of power that we can explain the ‘stickiness’ of traditions or 
practices. Individuals, groups and communities do not want to give up on their ideas and 
beliefs; they desperately cling on to their beliefs because it is this which ensures stability 
for their everyday lives and establishes meaning for their actions. To question is to 
threaten their views of reality. So, just as much as everyday practices and power relations 
have a constitutive role to play in allowing situated actors to make sense of their world, 
practices and power are therefore also essential in negotiating dilemmas. This helps to 
explain the ‘stickiness’ or flexibility of traditions. Returning once more to the examples of 
Labour Party policy changes, NHS reforms and governance practices, an explanatory 
account requires us to explore how webs of belief in these cases change as a result of power 
relations as played out through practices; i.e. how different actors within those institutions 
made sense of problems and what power relations existed to mediate ruptures taking place 
within webs of belief. 
 
 
3. Implications: dilemmas in the political terrain 
 
To revisit Bevir and Rhodes’ original description, dilemmas are ‘authoritative 
understandings that put into question’ a situated actor’s existing webs of belief. It depends 
on actors interpreting something as a dilemma – they are not outside interpretation. 
However, we do not know much beyond this. The process of change, and the context in 
which those changes take place, is often left unexplained. As a result, the explanatory 
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power and dynamism of the interpretive approach is weakened. This is why a focus on 
problematisations offers an important corrective. It allows us to further develop our 
understanding of dilemmas in two ways. First, problematisations draw our attention to 
the importance of everyday practices to explain how dilemmas unfold. This suggests that 
we can explain the process of change in interpretive schema not by simply juxtaposing 
different constellations of ideas or webs of belief, but how those beliefs play out in the 
habits, routines and everyday behaviour of actors. Second, problematisations develop the 
notion that dilemmas are structured in a context of power relations. By this, it suggests 
that we can explain why some aspects of traditions may change and others resist 
modification through the very way that a dilemma is structured.  
 
Taken together, we can say that dilemmas unfold when diverse beliefs, practices and 
traditions meet, connect, intersect, bump or even crash into one another. It is the moment 
of intersection that is mediated by everyday practices and power relations when a dilemma 
emerges. These notions are not sufficiently developed or articulated in Bevir and Rhodes’ 
empirical work, nor do the authors offer an alternative explanation for how dilemmas play 
out. While this had been an explanatory weakness in interpretive political science, insights 
from Michel Foucault’s concept of problematisation offer useful interventions to 
strengthen the interpretive framework. How situated agents negotiate dilemmas and 
problems tells interpretive scholars a lot: by setting priorities, their values and their 
beliefs; by making decisions, their extent and interpretation of power. Crucially, we can 
analyse these issues through Bevir and Rhodes’ existing interpretive approach. 
Analytically, their concepts of beliefs, practices, traditions, narratives and dilemmas 
remain as pertinent as ever; methodologically, their techniques (especially participant and 
non-participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviews) focus on 
everyday practices and the dilemmas that situated agents face. Importantly, analysis must 
centralise everyday practices and heighten the constitutive role that power plays 
examining how dilemmas unfold. When asking why dilemmas emerge, we must point 
towards the practices of everyday life and questions that those practices pose for situated 
agents as they navigate their social and political world. When asking how dilemmas 
develop and how they are resolved, we can look towards the agenda that a 
problematisation has set, the power relations between groups and individuals, and the 
nature of the conflicts between ideas, beliefs, practices and traditions. 
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The above discussion has a wider implication for our understanding of politics and the 
political terrain. In focusing on the importance of the contest or clash of ideas, and how 
this affects established webs of belief and everyday practices, we can say that a moment of 
a dilemma is a moment of politics. As Alan Finlayson (2007: p.552, emphasis added) 
suggests: 
 
If we begin with a clear and distinct concept of politics as the ‘arena’ within which we 
see expressed the irreducible and contested plurality of public life, the ineradicable 
contestation of differing world-views, then it is clear that what is distinct in politics is 
not the presence of beliefs but the presence of beliefs in contradiction with each other, 
not decisions about courses of action but of dispute over decisions and courses of 
action. 
 
Such a definition of politics was noted in section 1.2, and chimes well with an anti-
foundationalist philosophy. In taking interpretation seriously, it suggests that all 
established practices and webs of belief are historically contingent. Everyday practices 
create a sense of order by disguising or concealing potential conflicts, political differences 
and social tensions. When those practices are questioned – through dilemmas – it 
questions how society should be ordered, preserved or changed. As a consequence, 
contestation must be intimately and inextricably linked to politics and political action. 
Politics is not about the resolution of a conflict, the settlement of a dispute, or the outcome 
of a policy. Rather, it describes the process of contestation. Dilemmas begin the process of 
contestation and politicisation; their resolution depoliticises an issue. This occurs 
precisely through everyday practices and power relations discussed earlier. This is 
intuitive to how we understand democratic politics. Most democratic political systems are 
premised on the idea that politicians must compete for office through elections. 
Democracies offer a conflictual space where people can offer contrasting visions for social 
and political order, where people can disagree about means and ends (and even the 
meaning of the means and ends). Without this space, whether it is played out in the House 
of Commons chamber between government and opposition or on the sofas of breakfast 
news programmes, political action and reaction would be reduced to technocratic 
problem-solving. In focusing on dilemmas, we focus directly on the drama of politics. This 
reintroduces a sense of dynamism that had arguably been removed from Bevir and 
Rhodes’ empirical work, a criticism noted earlier in this article. As such, a focus on 
dilemmas is a focus on the central dynamics of what we conceive as political. 
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To ground the implications of this article’s approach in less abstract terms, let us return 
to previously cited examples, specifically governance practices in The State as Cultural 
Practice (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010: pp.136-55). The authors summarise three different 
stories to explain how different policy actors have dealt with the dilemma of fragmented 
service delivery following reforms to the state in the 1980s and 1990s: first, the 
centralisation story, i.e. attempts by Tony Blair to create a prime minister’s department; 
second, the management story, i.e. attempts to improve public sector management; and 
third, the governance story, i.e. power dependencies within the core executive. The 
authors make use of beliefs and traditions of key actors to tell these stories. However, this 
does not explain where these stories come from, to whom they exert appeal, or how they 
link to each other. It is here where the insights from this article could play a decisive role. 
In making dilemmas the prism through which to conduct analysis, it would develop the 
stories differently. First, it would stress the effect of everyday practices of a range of 
different policy actors, all of whom push and pull service delivery in different directions. 
It is these everyday practices (informed by beliefs) that ultimately run into dead ends or 
problems that requires institutional change. Second, it would stress how the dilemmas is 
framed by different actors in order to examine where different narratives come from, 
whether it is the need for centralisation or a preference for further new public 
management tools. And third, it would stress the power relations between different actors 
to explore which of the different narratives exerts more or less persuasive appeal. All three 
elements were elided in The State as Cultural Practice, which, if taken into account, would 
radically re-frame their analysis towards one focused on practices, power and the clash of 
different beliefs and traditions that arises as a result. The focus of analysis would be on 
the battle of different narratives, including the personal relationships between Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown, the practices of policy actors at different institutional levels in 
government, the importance of dominant traditions that structure those practices (e.g. 
continued belief in collective cabinet responsibility or parliamentary sovereignty), and so 
on. In focusing on the contest between beliefs, practices and traditions, the analysis would 
also highlight the intrinsically political nature of governance reforms as part of wider 
changes to the distribution of resources at an executive level. 
 
This brief illustration seeks to show what is missing from Bevir and Rhodes’ current 
analysis and what insights this article brings to bear on their research. Overall, the article 
argues for a much stronger focus on conflict, something that is inherently political, to see 
how beliefs, values and traditions interact with everyday practices and power relations. 
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This not only presents us with new, rich opportunities to use ‘dilemmas’ to understand 
political change within, as part of, and beyond institutional boundaries, but it also 
strengthens the explanatory value of adopting an interpretive outlook in political science. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This article opened with the important contribution that Bevir and Rhodes’ work has made 
on British political science, and especially on the literature on executive governance. Their 
approach has – and will continue to – affect the way we study political phenomena more 
generally. And yet, there are chinks in the interpretive armoury that deserve further 
attention and discussion. This article has focused on dilemmas to further enhance their 
approach for the study of politics. This began, in the first section, by highlighting a 
noticeable shortcoming in how the concept of dilemma has been theorised and applied in 
interpretive political science. In particular, the concept is not central to analysis and so it 
has been difficult to explain political change and stability in Bevir and Rhodes’ approach. 
While other scholars have looked at the concept of power, used rhetorical analysis or 
linked interpretive approaches to constructivist ones, this article sought to ameliorate 
those shortcomings in the second section through an articulation of the concept of 
‘problematisation’. This concept, as developed by Michel Foucault, centralises everyday 
practices and power relations as a focus for analysis. This is vital because it looks more 
closely at how situated agents’ beliefs, practices and traditions interact with one another 
in direct and explicit response to dilemmas. This has wider ramifications, most notably 
highlighting the political nature of conflict and contestation, brought out in the third 
section. In making dilemmas central, it refocuses analysis explicitly on the politics of 
clashing beliefs and strengthens the explanatory value of the interpretive approach.  
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